As a result of Intel's rebates, the ability of rival manufacturers to competeand innovate was impaired, and this led to reduced choice for consumers. Rebatessuch as those applied by Intel are recognised in many jurisdictions around theworld as anti-competitive and unlawful because the effect in practice is to denyconsumers a choice of products. Payments to prevent sales of specific rival productsIntel also interfered directly in the relations between computer manufacturersand AMD. Intel awarded computer manufacturers payments - unrelated to anyparticular purchases from Intel - on condition that these computer manufacturerspostponed or cancelled the launch of specific AMD-based products and/or putrestrictions on the distribution of specific AMD-based products. The Commissionfound that these payments had the potential effect of preventing products forwhich there was a consumer demand from coming to the market. The Commissionfound the following specific cases:* For the 5% of computer manufacturer B`s business that was not subject to theconditional rebate outlined above, Intel made further payments to computermanufacturer B provided that this manufacturer: * sold AMD-based business desktops only to small and medium enterprises * sold AMD-based business desktops only via direct distribution channels (asopposed to through distributors) and * postponed the launch of its first AMD-based business desktop in Europe by 6months.

* Intel made payments to computer manufacturer E provided that this manufacturerpostponed the launch of an AMD-based notebook from September 2003 to January2004. * Before the conditional rebate to computer manufacturer D outlined above, Intelmade payments to this manufacturer provided that it postponed the launch ofAMD-based notebooks from September 2006 to the end of 2006.The Commission obtained proof of the existence of many of the conditions foundto be illegal in the antitrust decision even though they were not made explicitin Intel`s contracts. Such proof is based on a broad range of contemporaneousevidence such as e-mails obtained inter alia from unannounced on-siteinspections, in responses to formal requests for information and in a number offormal statements made to the Commission by the other companies concerned. Inaddition, there is evidence that Intel had sought to conceal the conditionsassociated with its payments x86 CPUs are the main hardware component of a computer. The decision contains abroad range of contemporaneous evidence that shows that AMD, essentially Intel'sonly competitor in the market, was generally perceived, by computermanufacturers and by Intel itself, to have improved its product range, to be aviable competitor, and to be a growing competitive threat.

The decision findsthat Intel's practices did not constitute competition on the merits of therespective Intel and AMD products, but rather were part of a strategy designedto exploit Intel's existing entrenched position in the market. For example, rival chip manufacturer AMD offered one million free CPUs to oneparticular computer manufacturer. If the computer manufacturer had accepted allof these, it would have lost Intel's rebate on its many millions of remainingCPU purchases, and would have been worse off overall simply for having acceptedthis highly competitive offer. Because computer manufacturersare dependent on Intel for a majority of their x86 CPU supplies, only a limitedpart of a computer manufacturer's x86 CPU requirements is open to competition atany given time. Intel structured its pricing policy to ensure that a computer manufacturer whichopted to buy AMD CPUs for that part of its needs that was open to competitionwould consequently lose the rebate (or a large part of it) that Intel providedfor the much greater part of its needs for which the computer manufacturer hadno choice but to buy from Intel.